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Defending Conventions as Functionally
a Priori Knowledge
David J. Stumpy
Recent defenses of a priori knowledge can be applied to the idea of conventions in science in
order to indicate one important sense in which conventionalism is correct—some elements
of physical theory have a unique epistemological status as a functionally a priori part of our
physical theory. I will argue that the former a priori should be treated as empirical in a very
abstract sense, but still conventional. Though actually coming closer to the Quinean position
than recent defenses of a priori knowledge, the picture of science developed here is very
diﬀerent from that developed in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be
diﬀerentiated.
It would be hard to ﬁnd a more crucial epistemological problem than
that of the character of a priori knowledge.
—Coﬀa 1991
Our ‘‘empirical propositions’’ do not form a homogeneous mass.
—Wittgenstein 1969
1. Introduction. One way to organize much of twentieth-century philos-
ophy of science is to read it as a series of debates over what had been con-
sidered a priori knowledge. Although synthetic a priori knowledge was
oﬃcially rejected by the Vienna Circle with their adoption of empiricism in
the 1929 pamphlet ‘‘Wissenschaftliche Weltauﬀassung: Der Wiener Kreis’’
(Neurath [1929] 1974), parts of knowledge that had been considered a
priori by Kant, such as geometry, space and time, causality, and the basic
principles of physics, were widely discussed throughout the twentieth
century and statements about them have often been given a special role,
either as conventions, or as the hard core of scientiﬁc theories. One would
yTo contact the author, please write to: University of San Francisco, Philosophy Department,
2130 Fulton Street, San Francisco, CA 94117; e-mail: stumpd@usfca.edu.
1149
Philosophy of Science, 70 (December 2003) pp. 1149–1160. 0031-8248/2003/7005-0024$10.00
Copyright 2003 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
think that Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction (1953)
would have put the ﬁnal nail in the coﬃn of a priori knowledge and that a
holism in which all scientiﬁc statements are justiﬁed empirically has
replaced the notion of any special status for what was formerly consid-
ered to be a priori. However, several recent discussions have questioned to
what extent a priori knowledge has been refuted (Creath 1991; Friedman
2001; Hanson and Hunter 1992; Stein 1992; Richardson 1997). While it is
possible to defend Carnap or even Kant from Quinean holistic empiricism,
I will take a new approach to the question and argue that the former a priori
should be treated as empirical in a very abstract sense but also as con-
ventional. By conventionalism, I mean the idea that some elements of
physical theory have a unique epistemological status—one must adopt
these elements in order to begin empirical inquiry. They therefore function
as an a priori part of our physical theory that is chosen for conceptual or
pragmatic reasons, prior to any empirical testing. Though I am willing to
concede to Quine that these conventions are ultimately empirical, the
picture of knowledge developed here is very diﬀerent from that developed
in Quinean holism in that categories of knowledge can be diﬀerentiated.
While Quine admits that some elements of empirical theory are much less
likely to be revised than others, he underestimates the asymmetric relation
between the ‘‘hard core’’ and the ‘‘periphery.’’ It is not just that the
periphery is more likely to be revised than the hard core, but rather that the
statements of the periphery cannot even be stated, let alone tested, without
the hard core functioning as an a priori in the Kantian sense as a necessary
precondition.
The literature on conventions in science begins with Mach and Poincare´
(who hold that we choose Euclidean geometry to describe space, regard-
less of what experiment says) and continues with the Vienna Circle, espe-
cially Schlick, Carnap, and Reichenbach (in his trilogy of books on space-
time). A diﬀerent interpretation of conventionalism was later developed by
C. I. Lewis, Victor Lenzen, Arthur Pap, who is responsible for the term
‘‘functional a priori,’’ and by Russell Norwood Hanson. Kuhn eventually
(and tentatively) picked up the idea of a conventional treatment of syn-
thetic a priori knowledge as an explication of his own views (Kuhn 1990),
and Ian Hacking has advocated something similar to conventionalism with
his notion of ‘‘styles of reasoning’’ (Hacking 1992). Many of these
treatments of a priori knowledge share the idea that what Kant took to
be necessary can and indeed has changed through the development of
scientiﬁc theories.1
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1. Lakatos criticized Poincare´ for seeing conventions (especially Euclidean geometry) as
unchanging (Lakatos [1970] 1978, 49). While it is true that Poincare´ said there would never
be a reason to stop using Euclidean geometry in physical theory, he was also willing to
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The development of non-Euclidean geometries, and especially of the
General Theory of Relativity (GTR), made a profound impact on philos-
ophy of science in the early twentieth century by showing philosophers
that fundamental aspects of physical theory could be changed. Conceptual
change of this sort is what many postpositivist philosophers of science,
such as Kuhn, Toulmin, Laudan, and Shapere, saw as a fundamentally
important aspect of science. Thus, the idea that there are conventions at the
heart of science was already well developed prior to the Vienna Circle,
continued in the work of the Vienna Circle and in Logical Empiricism, and
was maintained even in postpositivist philosophy of science. My aim here
is to present a coherent picture of conventionalism.
2. Standard Critiques of Conventionalism. Schlick’s 1938 interpretation
of conventionalism seems to have been extremely inﬂuential, in part be-
cause of the inﬂuence he had on Reichenbach, but also because it was
translated by Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck and reprinted in their in-
ﬂuential collection, Readings in the Philosophy of Science (Schlick [1938]
1953). Schlick interpreted Poincare´’s conventionalism as a version of ho-
lism (i.e., the Duhem-Quine thesis), an epistemological interpretation that
has been standard ever since, especially in Popper’s critique of conven-
tionalism. Since all empirical theories—not just physical geometry—are
underdetermined in the Duhemian sense, the major interpretive problem
for those who hold the epistemological interpretation of Poincare´’s
conventionalism is to explain why he holds that only geometry is con-
ventional. Poincare´’s conventionalism is limited, so it cannot be equivalent
to the Duhem-Quine thesis (or holism).2
Schlick’s critique of what he calls conventionalism was also very in-
ﬂuential, but unfortunately it seems to have muddied the discussion of con-
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change some of his views about basic elements of physical theory. While Poincare´ explicitly
denies the existence of atoms in Science and Hypothesis, arguing that the atomic hypothesis
was useful but not the only possible explanation for chemical and other phenomena, he
accepted their reality after he learned of the work of Jean Perrin (Nye 1976). In at least one
case, Poincare´ also accepted the refutation of a fundamental principle of physics, what he
calls a ‘‘natural hypothesis,’’ by empirical theory. When he accepted quantum theory as
presented in the ﬁrst Solvay conference in 1911, Poincare´ gave up the hypothesis of
continuity (McCormmach 1967). Even in Carnap’s view one can revise by changing
languages. While it is true that for Carnap choosing a language includes dividing sentences
conclusively between analytic and synthetic for that language, one can start all over with a
new language and a diﬀerent distribution of analytic and synthetic sentences.
2. See especially Poincare´’s polemic with LeRoy for a clear statement of the limits of
Poincare´’s conventionalism (1902, reprinted as 1905, chapters 10 and 11).
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ventionalism while leaving holism unscathed. Schlick argues that con-
ventionalists are caught in a dilemma (Schlick [1938] 1953, 187): If
conventionalism involves only the choice of symbols or of explicitly de-
ﬁned terms, then conventions are analytic. Conventions, taken as changes
in explicit deﬁnitions, can only result in trivial notational variation, not
genuine change of physical theory. If conventions are synthetic, they are
testable empirically and Poincare´’s metric conventionalism is empirically
false. Schlick argues that natural laws must be treated either as genuine
claims, in which case they have truth values, are synthetic, and are to be
justiﬁed or rejected empirically, or they must be treated as explicitly stip-
ulated deﬁnitions, in which case they are analytic, lack truth values, and
turn out to be irrelevant to science.
Schlick assumes a position here that is clearly equivalent to a strict form
of empiricism and therefore begs the question against Kantian or other
idealists. Why should a Kantian accept Schlick’s view that all synthetic
scientiﬁc claims must be justiﬁed empirically? Even if we accept the view
that a priori justiﬁcations of knowledge (e.g., by intuition) are problematic
and should be ruled out, it does not follow that all knowledge should be
justiﬁed in the same way. Rather than defend Kant, the point to emphasize
here is that Schlick mistakenly treats all empirical statements as having an
equal role in the structure of knowledge. What Schlick misses is the
element of scientiﬁc theories that function as a priori knowledge.
Michael Friedman has detailed how Schlick’s inﬂuence changed Reich-
enbach’s views on conventionalism after an exchange of letters between
the two. As Friedman points out, Reichenbach’s important early critique of
conventionalism is lost in his later work where he adopts Schlick’s inter-
pretation of conventionalism. Reichenbach’s early point is that the GTR
has shown that metric conventionalism is false:
[M]athematicians asserted that a geometrical system was established
according to conventions and represented an empty schema that did
not contain any statements about the physical world. It was chosen on
purely formal grounds and might equally well be replaced by a non-
Euclidean schema. In the face of these criticisms the objection of the
general theory of relativity embodies a completely new idea. This
theory asserts simply and clearly that the theorems of Euclidean
geometry do not apply to our physical space. (Reichenbach as cited in
Friedman 1994, 26, and in Friedman 1999, 66–67)
Although the underlying mathematical structure of GTR does not have a
determinate metric, metric is determined empirically in GTR by the dis-
tribution of mass and energy. According to the GTR, we do not con-
ventionally choose a metric geometry—Euclidean geometry is not ade-
quate for the GTR. However, this was not widely understood until the
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
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1970s and 80s, that is, until the relatively contemporary discussion of
spacetime theories (Friedman 1994, 27, 67).3
When Reichenbach adopts Schlick’s holistic version of conventionalism
in The Philosophy of Space and Time (1958), he argues for conven-
tionalism epistemologically, as can be seen especially clearly in his intro-
duction of his theorem Q (1958, 33). An empirically testable theory is a
combination of geometry and physics, so geometries can be conventionally
chosen as long as adjustments are made in physics. Mach makes a similar
Duhemian argument against absolute theories of space when he incor-
porates universal forces in his defense of relationalism. Mach argues that
we cannot know whether it is absolute space or distant objects plus a
universal force that account for inertial eﬀects (Sklar 1974, 201; Friedman
1983, 296–301).
It will be useful to compare Schlick and Reichenbach’s views with more
recent literature on spacetime conventionalism, for we will see a parallel
debate developed in the critique of Gru¨nbaum’s conventionalism. Gru¨n-
baum, to his credit, never accepted Schlick’s interpretation of Poincare´’s
conventionalism. He thought that conventionalism follows not from ho-
lism but rather solely from the continuity of space. Friedman objected to
Gru¨nbaum’s argument in Foundations of Space-Time Theories as follows:
If we are to draw any conclusions about ‘‘metrical amorphousness’’
from the continuity of physical space, we need an additional premise:
namely, that the only spatio-temporal relations that objectively exist
are topological relations and order relations. It follows from this claim
that properties and relations not deﬁnable in terms of topological
properties and order relations do not objectively exist and, con-
sequently, that a continuous space objectively lacks metrical proper-
ties. (Friedman 1983, 304)
To shorten a long story considerably, it is now widely acknowledged that
metric conventionalism requires a fully relational theory of space, yet none
of the historically accepted space or spacetime theories—Newtonian, STR
or GTR—have been fully relational in the required sense. Friedman’s point
here is essentially the same as Reichenbach’s point in 1920, that GTR
shows metric conventionalism to be untrue. Thus, the major critique of
geometric conventionalism that was developed within the recent literature
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
3. I should mention, however, that I have recently found a similar idea from F. Enriques,
always a critic of Poincare´’s conventionalism, who writes in 1938 about ‘‘Poincare´’s cele-
brated doctrine of conventions that we had the occasion to examine and refute in our book
Problems of Science (1906). The development of Einstein’s theory of relativity has given the
coup de graˆce to this doctrine’’ (Enriques 1938, 29).
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on space and time argued that physical theory does not support the con-
ventionalist thesis. Sklar would seem to agree with this point when he ar-
gues that the only possible way to defend metric conventionalism now is
with holism (Sklar 1986). While Schlick and Popper’s critique of con-
ventionalism was philosophical, the recent critique was based on natural
science.
The recent discussion has shown that with the proper background the-
ory, Poincare´’s conventionalism would have been possible. It is a merely
contingent fact (and rather surprising too) that uniform acceleration is
detectable and unrelativizable, while uniform velocity is not detectable and
is relativisable. The most important point for this discussion, however, is
that the epistemological status of the metric of space or spacetime changed
as we changed background theories. In this case, Newtonian theory and
GTR each set the epistemological status of space (or spacetime). In
Newtonian theory we know a priori that space is Euclidean, but in GTR,
the metric is determined empirically. Thus, background theory and context
determine what is a priori and what is empirical, that is, which parts of the
theory function as a priori knowledge. For example, the Newtonian
theories of space and of motion are empirical theories, but the metric of
space is Euclidean and functions as a priori knowledge within Newtonian
theory. It is true that an empirical theory determines the metric of space,
but only in a very indirect and abstract sense. The metric of space is not
testable within any of the historical spacetime theories. Perhaps our current
theory of the metric of spacetime received an empirical conﬁrmation, along
with the rest of the GTR, but this metric was neither conceived of nor
justiﬁed by empirical considerations in anything like the way that ordinary
empirical claims are.
This viewpoint is, of course, close to Carnap’s in that the background
commitments of a scientiﬁc theory determine what is a priori and what is
empirical. However, Carnap makes a mistake in considering the back-
ground commitments as a language. He sees a priori truths as analytic,
leaving himself vulnerable to Schlick’s critique of conventions as trivial, as
well as to further critiques by Quine. The process of determining what is a
priori and what is empirical is embedded within a physical, empirical
theory. It is necessary to develop a considerable amount of theory before
empirical tests are possible at all, and even then, it may seem that empirical
tests have very little to do with, for example, the truth of Euclidean
geometry. Nevertheless, Newtonian theory is ultimately empirical, that is,
our change from Newtonian theory to STR and to GTR has an empirical
basis.
3. Geometric Conventionalism and the Constitution of Knowledge.
Reichenbach introduces his famous distinction between two meanings of
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
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‘a priori’ in the following passage from The Theory Relativity and A Priori
Knowledge:
Kant’s concept of a priori has two diﬀerent meanings. First, it means
‘‘necessarily true’’ or ‘‘true for all times’’ and secondly, ‘‘constituting
the concept of object.’’ The second meaning must be clariﬁed. Accord-
ing to Kant, the object of knowledge, the thing of appearance, is not
immediately given. Perceptions do not give the object, only the ma-
terial of which it is constructed. Such constructions are achieved by an
act of judgment. The judgment is the synthesis constructing the object
from the manifold of the perception. (Reichenbach 1965, 48)
Constitution needs to be clarified because it could seem to lead immedi-
ately to idealism—the construction of physical objects by perception. For
example, we might consider that when Kuhn introduces his ‘‘changes of
world view’’ language in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he says,
‘‘I have so far argued only that paradigms are constitutive of science. Now
I wish to display a sense in which they are constitutive of nature as well’’
(Kuhn [1962] 1997, 110). Here conventionalists seem to be caught in a
further dilemma. If there are synthetic a priori principles, then it seems that
one is committed to idealism, since the a priori element in knowledge con-
stitutes the object of knowledge. If, on the other hand, all synthetic state-
ments are a posteriori, then one is committed to empiricism and Schlick’s
dilemma appears. However, Quine’s critique of the analytic-synthetic dis-
tinction should give one pause when considering Schlick’s dilemma. It
may be true that conventionalism is diﬃcult to formulate without the ana-
lytic-synthetic distinction, but Schlick’s critique is diﬃcult to formulate as
well. While the empiricist version of conventionalism seems problematic, I
believe that it can be defended and is preferable to idealism.4
Fortunately, idealism is not required to defend conventions as func-
tionally a priori; all that is necessary is to recognize the diﬀerent epis-
temological status of various parts of a physical theory. All of these parts
can be ultimately empirical, but they are not all empirical in the same way,
since some are more embedded and less directly testable than others are.
C. I. Lewis emphasizes this crucial point in his discussion of how his view
diﬀers from that of the Vienna Circle (Lewis [1941] 1970, 106). Even
more signiﬁcantly, some elements of a theory are required before others
can be tested or indeed even formulated. By paying attention to what is
required for testing, the theory itself tells us what is functionally a priori
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
4. Friedman (1997, 2001) and De Pierris (1992) highlight the Kantian constitutive function
of a priori knowledge. I agree with considering the a priori as a necessary precondition in a
Kantian sense, but reject the idealistic overtones of the term constitution. I am also happy to
embrace the naturalism and empiricism that they reject.
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and what is empirical. Friedman has recently elaborated several examples
of a priori elements in physical science (2001, esp. ch. 2) and there is a long-
standing literature on the status of Newton’s laws that shows that they
cannot all be empirical at the same time (e.g., Pap 1946). Although their
intent is anticonventionalist, Forster and Sober’s defense of the evidential
signiﬁcance of simplicity as a criterion is congenial with the position that I
adopt here (1994). By analyzing Akaike’s statistical methods that are
widely employed in science, they discover that
the data tell you more than you may have thought. . . . At least in the
context of the curve-ﬁtting problem, Akaike’s technical result provides
a benchmark that identiﬁes the degree to which simplicity has evi-
dential signiﬁcance. (Forster and Sober 1994, 27)
However, Forster and Sober do not deny that application of Akaike’s theo-
rem requires the use of both physical and (pure) mathematical assump-
tions. In this sense, a functional a priori remains, and will always remain,
even if we discover that we have more of an empirical basis than most had
thought when we choose a simpler theory. The ultimate status of some of
the fundamental assumptions required to apply Akaike’s theorem is ambig-
uous in a way that supports my claim that classification of scientific
principles as a priori or empirical is a pragmatic decision, not a permanent
grounding of science:
[T]he assumption that measurement errors are normally distributed
around a mean value is so widespread in science that it is often
referred to as the law of errors. On the theoretical side, the central limit
theorem aﬀords a theoretical explanation of these empirical facts. In a
somewhat humorous tone, Crame´r (1946, 232) sums up by quoting
Lippman as saying: ‘everyone believes in the law of errors, the ex-
perimenters because they think it is a mathematical theorem, the
mathematicians because they think it is an experimental fact,’ and adds
that ‘both parties are perfectly right, provided that their belief is not
too absolute.’ (Forster and Sober 1994, 30)
What we have here is a set of regularity assumptions that come in stronger
and weaker mathematical forms. Although the assumptions are consistent
with experimental statistical work, they cannot be claimed to have been
tested. They are rather assumptions that are required for purely math-
ematical reasons.
The issue between idealist and empiricist versions of conventionalism
seems to come down to whether a priori principles are taken to be analytic
or synthetic. Carnap’s work represents the fullest working out of the view
that a priori principles are analytic, which leaves him open to the criticisms
that Quine makes in ‘‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’’ (1953) and in ‘‘Truth
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
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by Convention’’ (1935). Idealist leaning arguments seem to use the notion
of constitution in order to distinguish the functionally a priori from the rest
of knowledge. For example, according to Reichenbach, it is the consti-
tutive function that gives principles of physics and parts of mathematics
their distinctive epistemological status, one that is not captured by strict
empiricism and that is masked by holism:
[T]his view is distinct from an empiricist philosophy that believes it can
characterize all scientiﬁc statements indiﬀerently by the notion ‘‘derived
from experience.’’ Such an empiricist philosophy has not noticed the
great diﬀerence existing between speciﬁc physical laws and the
principles of coordination and is not aware of the fact that the latter
have a completely diﬀerent status from the former for the logical
construction of knowledge. The doctrine of the a priori has been
transformed into the theory that the logical construction of knowledge is
determined by a special class of principles, and that this logical function
singles out this class, the signiﬁcance ofwhich has nothing to dowith the
manner of its discovery and the duration of its validity. (Reichenbach
1965 as cited in Friedman 1994, 23, and in Friedman 1999, 62)
Empiricists can explain how it is possible to ‘‘harden’’ any empirical
statement, that is, to hold it ﬁxed as a postulate, but this may not be enough
of a distinction to overcome holism. Quine is comfortable admitting that in
practice, some statements are easy to harden and diﬃcult to test, while others
are easy to test and diﬃcult to harden. However, for the functional account
of the a priori to be compelling, it is not clear that the division between the
a priori and empirical parts of knowledge has to be as hard and fast as the
distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences, or as the distinction
between constitutive and nonconstitutive elements of knowledge.
First, how the distinction is to be drawn seems less important than
showing that there must be some functionally a priori element in order to
proceed. If there is always an a priori element of knowledge at least in a
functional sense, then there is no need to know in advance what counts as a
priori and what does not. When theories are tested or even formulated,
many explicit and implicit assumptions are made. It is possible to go back
over an experiment and challenge any of these assumptions as long as one
is willing to develop an alternative. The functional account of the a priori
does not require some aspects of knowledge to be permanently untestable,
rather, only that some aspects of theory be accepted conditionally. Second,
emphasizing the functional a priori aspect of parts of scientiﬁc theories and
ignoring the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements avoids
the necessity of developing a theory of language or of meaning. Empirical
theory determines what is a priori and what is not. Since no theory of
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
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meaning and language will be needed, Quine’s arguments against Carnap
will not apply. Furthermore, Quine’s main argument in ‘‘Two Dogmas of
Empiricism,’’ that there is no way to explain or justify the analytic-
synthetic distinction without begging the question, is simply irrelevant
because we are not trying to ground or to justify science. Beyond the usual
pragmatic and conceptual arguments, there is no need to justify conven-
tional choices with a philosophical theory—something Quine, as a prag-
matist, should know well! As Wittgenstein said, ‘‘The diﬃculty is to
realize the groundlessness of our believing’’ (1969, 24).
4. Positioning. By embracing empiricism, we can put to rest the epis-
temological debate between rationalism and empiricism. However, if we
wish to understand the nature of science, rather than continue the pre-
tension that we are putting it on a ﬁrm foundation, Quinean holism gives
us practically no answers, while conventionalism provides a framework for
signiﬁcant contributions to our understanding of scientiﬁc knowledge.
Since I adopt naturalism, fallibilism, and empiricism, it may seem that I
have simply landed with both feet in Quine’s camp, and in a sense that is
true. The naturalism that I can accept I deﬁne negatively as the view that
there is no ‘‘ﬁrst philosophy’’ that is prior to and independent of science.
By fallibilism I mean that there are no unrevisable beliefs and no certainty,
and by empiricism I mean that all truths, save explicitly stipulated deﬁ-
nitions, are empirically justiﬁed, though the functionally a priori parts of
physical theory are only empirical in the extremely tenuous sense that the
general theory that classiﬁed them as a priori is an empirical theory.
An interesting extension of Quine’s view can be found in Michael
Resnik’s work on the philosophy of mathematics (Resnik 1997).5 Pre-
senting a defense of empiricism and a reduced and subtle kind of realism in
mathematics, Resnik defends the indispensability thesis and promotes
Quinean holism, arguing that mathematics is not separable from the rest
of science and that justification of mathematics, once we move away from
local justifications within various branches of mathematics, ultimately
involves the role that mathematics plays in science as a whole. Resnik
defends epistemic holism by arguing that the objects of physics are not so
diﬀerent from those in mathematics and by accounting for the stability of
mathematics pragmatically. Mathematics will be tinkered with less fre-
#03170 UCP: PHOS article # 700524
5. Resnik’s main new additions to discussions in the philosophy of mathematics are struc-
turalism to account for the incompleteness of mathematical objects and a disquotational
account of reference and truth. Of particular signiﬁcance is the point that an immanent
account of reference eliminates one of the strongest arguments against mathematical realism.
A transcendental approach seems to require a causal theory of reference, and since math-
ematical objects are causally inert, it seems impossible to be a transcendent realist in math-
ematics.
1158 david j. stump
quently than experimental hypotheses and becomes relatively a priori, that
is, more likely to be taken for granted. However, Resnik admits that
mathematics is never falsified (1997, 133), leading one to wonder whether
this is not in itself prima facie evidence for a fundamental epistemic
diﬀerence between mathematics and the rest of science. This diﬀerence
may not be apparent when one’s only concern is the ultimate justiﬁcation
of mathematics, but it is immediately apparent when one considers the
very diﬀerent roles that mathematics and physical theory play in the web of
knowledge (to use Quine’s term). Thus, in a sense, the diﬀerence between
Quinean holism and a theory of the functional a priori is a matter of em-
phasis. Quineans emphasize the (ultimately) empirical nature of math-
ematical knowledge, while functional a priorists emphasize the con-
ventional basis of scientiﬁc knowledge. This does not mean, however,
that the ultimate grounding of science is a priori. Science as a whole re-
mains empirical, but saying so tells us very little about science. By simply
granting that such grounding is empirical, we can set aside the issue of the
ultimate justiﬁcation of mathematics and other fundamental principles of
science and focus attention instead on how these elements of scientiﬁc
theories function as a priori knowledge and as conventions, which is a
much more signiﬁcant result concerning the structure of science.
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